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last year. The court of appeals sustained the lower court which had
ruled in favor of the Legal Aid Society. The court of appeals held
that the payment of fees for the defense of indigent criminals into
a trust fund from which the Legal Aid defender's salary is paid is not
tantamount to the unauthorized practice of law. The court found,
further, that the furnishing of legal services in civil matters to those who
are unable to pay is a public service. Thus, the Legal Aid Society is not
acting as an intermediary between lawyer and client and is not engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law.
WILLIAM W. FALSGRAF

CIL PROCEDURE
A reading of Ohio cases decided during the past year reveals nothing
especially startling. Generally the cases reiterate existing law, some recite
poetry,' others "obfuscate." The cases discussed in this brief article were
selected as the most interesting. They are hardly coruscating.
SPECIAL APPEARANCE

Scott v. Davis' involved an action for damages for breach of contract
brought against Fred Davis, a resident of Miami County, where the action
was brought, and Central Plumbing Company, a resident of Montgomery
County, served with summons in Montgomery County.' Defendant Central Plumbing Company filed a demurrer, alleging that "the petition does
not state facts that show a cause of action against this defendant; that the
action was not brought within the time limited for the commencement of
such action; and that there is a misjoinder of parties defendant."4 The
court overruled the demurrer and defendant Central Plumbing Company
filed an answer containing a general denial and in addition repeating the
allegations of the demurrer. Subsequently, the court dismissed as to
Davis. At this juncture Central Plumbing Company (hereinafter referred to as defendant) moved for dismissal contending that when Davis
was dismissed the court lost jurisdiction over the defendant.
The case suggests that there are three methods by which one can challenge the court's jurisdiction over the person:' (1) a special appearance
1. Columbus v. Becher, 173 Ohio St. 197, 200, 180 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1962).
2. 173 Ohio St. 252, 181 N.E.2d 470 (1962).
3. OHIO REv. CODE § 2703.04 provides for service of summons in certain circumstances in
another county other than the one in which the action was brought.
4. Scott v. Davis, 173 Ohio St. 252, 253, 181 N.E.2d 470, 471 (1962).
5. Id. at 254, 181 N.E.2d at 472. As Scott v. Davis was decided in March, it is surprising that
the court failed to mention a fourth means of challenge sanctioned the preceding month in
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to move to quash the service of the summons or solely to challenge personal jurisdiction; (2) a demurrer to the petition alleging that it appears
from the face of the petition that the court lacks personal jurisdiction;' and
(3) an objection to personal jurisdiction in the answer if the alleged defect does not appear on the face of the petition.7 In the last situation,
where the objection is permitted in the answer, the challenge to jurisdiction over the person may be joined with an attack on the merits. This is
the only situation in Ohio where such a joinder does not constitute a general appearance. In any case the challenge to jurisdiction over the person must be made "at the first opportunity."'
Filing a demurrer which relates to the merits of the case in any part
will be equated with a general appearance.' Thus, in this case the deState ex rel. Tempero v. Colopy, 173 Ohio St. 122, 180 N.E.2d 273 (1962).

Colopy and

its relationship to Scott is discussed at 396 infra. Note that the three methods of challenging jurisdiction over the person constitute exceptions to the statutory provision that "the voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to service." OrIO REV. CODE S 2703.09.
6. "The defendant may demur to the petition only when it appears on its face that:
(A) The court has not [no) jurisdiction of the person of the defendant;
(B) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action;
(C) The plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue;
(D) There is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(E) There is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff or defendant;
(F) There is a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant,
(G) Several causes of action are improperly joined;
(H) Separate causes of action against several defendants are improperly joined;
(I)
The action was not brought within the time limited for the commencement of such
actions;
(J) The petition does not state facts which show a cause of action." OHIo REv. CODE
§ 2309.08.
7. See Bucurenciu v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927); OHo REV. CODE S
2309.10.
8. Scott v. Davis, 173 Ohio St. 252, 254, 181 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1962).
9. This is not the case in a federal district court. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
Why the defense available under OHIo REV. CODE § 2309.08 (A) is waived when joined
with defenses (B)-(J) is not apparent from the related statutes. OHIo REv. CODE § 2309.09
provides that, if the objections in a demurrer are not specific, it is to be "regarded as objecting
only that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action or that the petition
does not state facts which show a cause of action." Orno REV. CODE § 2309.10 treats defenses
presented by demurrer precisely the same as those presented in the answer.
Justice Taft in his concurring opinion, after citing the above sections of the code, concludes:

"In view of these statutes, I have considerable doubt about paragraph two of the syllabus."
Scott v. Davis, 173 Ohio St. 252, 257, 181 N.E.2d 470, 474 (concurring opinion). Paragraph two of the syllabus encompasses the dictum expressed by the majority: "Although the
filing of a demurrer which attacks solely the jurisdiction of the person does not constitute a
general entry of appearance, where such demurrer as to jurisdiction of the person is coupled
with an attack on the petition on the basis that it does not state a cause of action, such demurrer
relates to the merits of the cause and constitutes a general entry of appearance." Id. at 255-56,
181 N.E.2d at 473 (Emphasis added.) This statement is dictum because in Scott the defendant's demurrer did not include an objection to jurisdiction of its person. Thus the statement
does not coincide with the facts of the case, but paragraph two of the syllabus extends the scope
of the statement to include those facts.
Professor Moore persuasively argues that "the theory of the [federal) Rule is that the quick
presentation of defenses and objections should be encouraged, and that successive motions
which prolong such presentation should be carefully limited. Accordingly a party is protected
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murrer of defendant raising defenses (E), (I), and (J)' 0 was equivalent
to a general appearance. Further, by failing to raise the defense specified
in Ohio Revised Code section 2309.08 (A) in the demurrer, defendant
waived that defense under Ohio Revised Code sections 2309.09 and
2309.10.
REVIEW BY PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS

State ex rel. Ternpero v. Colopy1 ' was ignored by the court in Scott
v. Davis, although the basic issue in the case was the manner in which
a defendant can challenge jurisdiction of the person. Colopy, who had
neither received service of process nor entered an appearance, found himself a defendant in an in personam action in the court of common pleas.
Rather than take advantage of one of the three conventional methods of
attack on personal jurisdiction available in the court of common pleas,
Colopy filed a petition in the court of appeals asking that a writ of prohibition" issue against the judges of the court of common pleas to arrest
the in personam action. The court of appeals issued the writ, and the
plaintiff in the in personam action, Moreland, appealed to the supreme
court, which affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
Undoubtedly there are unusual cases in which a proper exercise of
discretion would require the court of appeals to issue a writ of prohibition, 3 since the remedy in the ordinary course of the law is inadequate.
But the supreme court was unable to determine whether this was such a
situation since no bill of exceptions had been filed in the supreme court.
[I] t is contended that relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of the law, and that, therefore, the Court of Appeals should have
refused to allow the writ. We believe it unnecessary to decide in the
instant case whether relator has such a remedy.

This court in the exercise of its discretion will usually refuse to
allow a writ of prohibition or of mandamus where the relator has an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. However, it has
the power to, and may in the exercise of its discretion, issue such a writ
in such an instance.
A Court of Appeals has this same discretion . . . . Therefore, the
judgment of a Court of Appeals, granting a writ of prohibition or of
against waiver merely because he has joined certain defenses or objections together; but he
may waive defenses if he makes a motion and fails to assert all the grounds available to him."
2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE § 12.12, at 2260 (2d ed. 1962).
10. See note 6 supra.
11. 173 Ohio St. 122, 180 N.E.2d 273 (1962).
12. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6 provides that the courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition.
13. For such a situation see State ex rel. Gelman v. Common Pleas Court, 172 Ohio St. 70,
173 N.B.2d 343 (1961).
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mandamus, will not be reversed merely because the
relator has an adex4
quate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
Colopy, with its cavalier language, disregards the longstanding rule
in Ohio that the extraordinary writ of prohibition is not to be employed
as a device to circumvent the ordinary appellate process. This rule was
propounded in 1960 in State ex rel. Schumacher v. Victor 5 by the supreme court, which ignored the rule in 1962. The only decision involving the writ of prohibition relied on by the court is State ex rel. Gelman
v. Common Pleas Court.'" The case is readily distinguished since it involved the filing of a divorce petition by a husband in the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County and a subsequent filing of a divorce petition
by his wife in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. The court
of appeals granted the husband's petition for a writ of prohibition and the
supreme court affirmed. The court simply applied the general rule that
the remedy of prohibition is available to restrain a court from exercising
jurisdiction where an identical cause of action between the same parties
17
has previously been lodged in another court of concurrent jurisdiction.
The case does not stand for the proposition that mandamus will not be
denied because a relator has an adequate remedy in law or equity.
The court in Colopy relied on mandamus decisions as well. In general the same rules apply to mandamus and prohibition regarding exhaustion of appellate remedies as a prerequisite to issuance of the writs,'"
since the writs are complementary: one requiring a court to exercise
jurisdiction, the other requiring the court to refrain from exercising juristion.

But section 2731.05 of the Revised Code expressly provides: "The
writ of mandamus must not be issued when there is a plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law." This section as construed by
the Ohio courts means that where any legal, equitable, or statutory remedy
is available, the use of mandamus is prohibited.'" State ex rel. Fredrix v.
14. State ex rel. Tempero v. Colopy, 173 Ohio St. 122, 123-24, 180 NY-2d 273, 274 (1962).
15. 171 Ohio St. 189, 168 N.E.2d 398 (1960). Nor is the writ available as a means of
obtaining review of the decisions of administrative agencies unless all administrative remedies
have been exhausted. See Culp, Survey of Ohio Law - Administrative Law and Procedure,
13 W. REs. L. REv. 425, 434 (1962).
16. 172 Ohio St. 70, 173 NXE.2d 343 (1961).
17. Id. at 71-72, 173 N.E.2d at 344 (1961).
18. Ibid.
19. State ex rel. Ricketts v. Balsly, 112 Ohio App. 555, 171 N.E.2d 538 (1960), afId, 171
Ohio St. 553, 173 N.B.2d 117 (1961). But since mandamus jurisdiction is conferred on the
supreme court and the court of appeals by the OHnO CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 2, 6, the statute cannot
reduce the jurisdiction of these courts to issue writs of mandamus from the common-law jurisdiction existing in 1851 when the constitution was adopted. State ex rel. Libbey-OwensFord Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 302, 123 N.E.2d 23 (1954). This does
not necessarily hold for the court of common pleas. See OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 18. Mandamus jurisdiction is conferred on the court of common pleas by statute. OHo REv. CoDE S
2731.02.
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Village of Beachwood2 and State ex rel. Gund Co. v. Village of Solon2 '
both held in effect that, where a relator fails to exhaust his appellate remedies under Ohio Revised Code section 2506.01,22 he cannot utilize mandamus as a substitute for appeal. These cases naturally led Professor Culp to
conclude last year that the use of mandamus to review zoning decisions
would be extremely limited.2 3 Unfortunately the court in Colopy did not
discuss these cases, apparently since it felt justified in relying on State ex
rel. Gelman v. Common Pleas Court2 4 and three mandamus cases: State
ex rel. W'esselman v. Board of Elections,2" State ex rel. Feighanv. Green,"6
and State27ex rel. Lorain County Sat. & Trust Co. v. Board of County
Comm' rs.
The question raised in Wesselman was: Can a relator who has an
adequate remedy by way of injunction or declaratory judgment obtain a
writ of mandamus? The court answered affirmatively. This case is not
strong precedent for the Colopy situation.2" The Feighan case raised
the same question as Wesselman and, in addition, the factor of an emergency need for an immediate decision. It too answered the question in
the affirmative. Its authority: State ex rel. Wesselman v. Board of
Elections. In the last of the trinity, State ex rel. Lorain County Say. &
Trust Co., the court cited section 2731.05 of the Revised Code. It then
properly cited State ex rel. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n"9 for the following:
A careful review of the decisions of this court indicates that the fol-

lowing principles are to be applied in considering whether the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretion should grant the extraordinary
writ of mandamus under its constitutional powers.
1. The relator must be the party beneficially interested.
2. Before the writ may issue, it must appear affirmatively that
there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law,

including equitable remedies.
20. 171 Ohio St. 343, 170 N.E.2d 847 (1960).
21. 171 Ohio St. 318, 170 N.E.2d 487 (1960).
22. This section provides for a review of final orders, adjudications, or decisions of boards
of any political subdivision of the state.
23. Culp, supra note 15, at 433.
24.

172 Ohio St. 70, 173 N.E.2d 343 (1961).

25.

170 Ohio St. 30, 162 N.E.2d 118 (1959).

26.

171 Ohio St. 263, 169 N.E.2d 551 (1960).

27. 171 Ohio St. 306, 170 N.E.2d 733 (1960).
28. Wesselman cites State ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469,
478, 127 N.E.2d 371, 376 (1955), for authority that mandamus may lie even though there is
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The proposition does appear at 163 Ohio
St. 478, 127 N.E.2d 376, but it is made by Justice Taft in his dissenting opinion in which
he argues against allowing mandamus where another adequate remedy exists. He makes the
point that the power exists, because of the constitutional grant (See note 19 supra.), but OHIO
REV. CODE § 2731.05 constrains the court from exercising that power where there is a plain
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
29. 162 Ohio St. 302, 123 N.E.2d 23 (1954).
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3. The extraordinary writ of mandamus may not be used as a substitute for a mandatory injunction.
4. It may not be used where the purpose of the relator is primarily
the enforcement or protection of purely private rights.30
However the court departed from the second principle citing Wesselman. 1
Thus Colopy and the mandamus cases cited therein represent a pernicious proliferation of precedent in an area where an efficient appellate
structure requires stringent limitation of the use of the extraordinary
writs to circumvent ordinary appellate procedure.
State ex rel. Thomas v. Ludewig exhibits an egregious disregard
for the statutory mandate that "the writ of mandamus must not be issued
when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." 3 Since it was the court of common pleas that issued the writ of
mandamus, no argument can be made that, regardless of statutory limitations, the constitution confers on that court the power to issue extraordinary writs to the same extent as at common law in 1851."In Ludewig relator's application for a permit to build a gasoline
station on his property was denied by the Commissioner of Inspections,
since the property was located in a residential zone. Contending that the
ordinance and its application to his situation were arbitrary, unreasonable,
and beyond the zoning power, relator obtained a writ of mandamus from
the court of common pleas ordering the Commissioner to issue to relator
a building permit for construction of a gasoline station. The court of
appeals affirmed.
As in Colopy, various conventional avenues of appeal from the Commissioner's action were open to relator. He could have applied to the
Board of Zoning Appeals for a variance, appealed to the same board
from the decision of the Commissioner, 5 or taken an appeal to the court
of common pleas under Ohio Revised Code section 2506.01.
The same objections that apply to Colopy are of equal force in Ludewig. The court's conclusion that mandamus may issue even if relator
has another adequate remedy rests on the authority of State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of E. Cleveland,3" State ex rel. Wesselman v.
8
Board of Elections," and State ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber."
30. State ex rel. Lorain County Sav. & Trust Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 171 Ohio St.
306, 308, 170 N.E.2d 733, 734-35 (1960).
31. Id. at 308-09, 170 N.E.2d at 735.
32. 116 Ohio App. 329, 187 N.E.2d 170 (1962).
33. OHIO REV. CODE § 2731.05.
34. See note 19 sfupra.
35. OHIO REV.CODE § 303.15.
36. 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d 1 (1959). It is significant that the mandamus action in
this case originated in the court of appeals.
37. 170 Ohio St. 30, 162 N.E.2d 118 (1959).
38. 171 Ohio St. 326, 170 N.E.2d 848 (1960). In this case the supreme court affirmed
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Judge Fess writes a well-reasoned opinion in Ludewig, dissenting 9
from the conclusion of the majority that the existence of another remedy
in the ordinary course of the law does not preclude the granting of a writ
of mandamus. After a careful examination of the relevant authorities,
Judge Fess concludes:
This dissenting member of the court therefore believes, from an
analysis of the Killeen, Wesselman and Grant cases, that there was no
intention on the part of the Supreme Court to modify the settled principle that mandamus is not available to subserve the purpose of an
appeal absent a showing that an appeal is not an adequate remedy under
the circumstances of the particular case. It is also to be noted that the
Wesselman and Killeen cases relate to injunction or declaratory judgment as an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and did
not deal40 with the availability of appeal as an adequate alternative
remedy.
FINAL ORDERS
A continuance of a case appears an unlikely candidate for classification as a final order.4 In Aero-Lite Window Co. v. Jackson' 2 the court
of appeals notes that a continuance becomes a final appealable order
when the order of the trial court is an abuse of discretion. 3 The court
discusses the facts of the case and concludes:
We have read the bill of exceptions in this case and do not find
the trial court to be guilty of an abuse of discretion in the instant
44 case.
The order appealed from thus does not constitute a final order.
Where granting a continuance "in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment," the right to appeal exists. 45 This occurred in Leiberg v. Vitangel 6 when the defendant's request for a continuance until
the end of the war was granted. An appeal was allowed, and the order
the judgment of the court of appeals (where the mandamus proceedings had originated)
which stated that the relator had "available an adequate remedy by way of appeal to the Common Pleas Court as well as by way of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and that a
writ of mandamus should be denied upon such ground." In affirming, the supreme court
noted, in dicta, that the court had recognized the power in the court to issue a mandamus even
where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. For authority
the court cited Wesselman.
39. State ex rel. Thomas v. Ludewig, 116 Ohio App. 329, 342, 187 N.E.2d 170, 178 (1962)
(separate opinion).
40. Id. at 347-48, 187 N.E.2d at 181-82 (separate opinion).
41. OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.03 provides for review of final orders.
42. 115 Ohio App. 257, 184 N.E.2d 677 (1962).
43. Id. at 258, 184 N.E.2d at 678 (1962), citing Norton v. Norton, 11 Ohio St. 262, 266,
145 N.E. 253, 254 (1924).
44. Aero-Lite Window Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ohio App. 257,258, 184 N.E.2d 677, 679 (1962).
45. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.02.
46. 70 Ohio App. 479, 47 N.E.2d 235 (1942).
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was reversed on the basis of abuse of discretion by the trial judge, the
court noting that England and France once fought a Thirty Years War.
MOTION FOR NEW TRuIL

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.Ballard' is a novel case, construing the
requirement that the application for a "new trial must be made within
ten days after the journal entry of a final order, judgment, or decree...
[is] approved by the trial court in writing and filed with the derk of
the court for journalization."48
A jury verdict against the plaintiffs was returned on May 9, 1961.
The same day a journal entry was filed with the clerk of courts, regarding
the trial, presentation of evidence, instructions to the jury, and the like.
However, the judgment entry on the verdict was not included in this
filing.
Ohio Revised Code section 2323.15 provides:
When a trial by jury has been had and a verdict rendered, unless
the court orders the case reserved for future argument or consideration,
a journal entry of judgment in conformity to the verdict shall be approved by the court in writing and filed with the derk for journalization.
Prior to the journal entry of final judgment the plaintiffs filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.49
A rule of the court provided:
[U]pon the filing of any motion or demurrer, the same shall be
assigned for disposition at 9:30 A. M on the third Wednesday following said filing....50
Thus the court by its rule had the case "reserved for future argument or
consideration" and could not order a journal entry of judgment pursuant
to the verdict. Plaintiffs' motions were heard on May 31, 1961, and
overruled as prematurely filed. A journal entry of judgment was then
made. On June 13, 1961, more than ten days after the journal entry of
judgment, the plaintiffs filed another motion for new trial. Since the
delayed filing was not within any of the statutory exceptions to the tenday filing requirement, 5 the court again overruled the motion.
Thus in Ohio a motion for new trial filed before a journal entry
of judgment is premature. After the motion is disposed of and a journal
47. 182 N.E.2d 36 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
48. Omo REv. CODE § 2321.19.
49. The time for filing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as
that for moving for a new trial, i.e., "within ten days after the journal entry of judgment in
conformity to the verdict approved by the court in writing and filed with the clerk for journalization.
OHIo REV. CODE § 2323.181 (Supp. 1962).
50. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 182 N.E.2d 36, 37-38 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
51. See Omo R.v. CODE § 2321.19.
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entry of judgment is entered, a new motion for new trial must be made
within the statutory ten-day period, the earlier motion having no validity
or legal effect.
DISCOVERY

In Reis v. Rickard52 the plaintiff attached interrogatories to his petition. After the statutory time limit for answering the interrogatories
had elapsed, the defendant moved to require the plaintiff to make his
petition more definite and certain. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for
an order requiring the defendant to answer the interrogatories or, in the
alternative, for an order granting a default judgment for the plaintiff
and requested that the defendant's motion to make the petition more
definite and certain be held in abeyance until the interrogatories were
answered.
The trial court sustained the defendanes motion. As for the interrogatories, the court ordered the defendant to respond after the plaintiff
had filed his amended petition. The plaintiff failed to comply with the
order to amend his petition and approximately two and a half months
later the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the case for want
of prosecution.
On appeal the court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was entitled
to have the interrogatories answered within the time limited for answer
to the petition.
Ohio Revised Code section 2309.44 provides: "When annexed to a
petition, the interrogatories... shall be answered within the time limited
for answer to the petition .... " The court concluded that this section
evinced a legislative intention that the answers to the interrogatories
were to be used in the preparation of a pleading or an amended pleading, such as the amended petition involved in this case. Since the trial
court denied to the plaintiff this right, reversal was required.
RES JUDICATA

Rowles"8

In Aubill v.
the plaintiff filed an action to recover for personal injuries inflicted by the negligence of the defendant in the operation
of his automobile. Subsequently the plaintiff and his insurer jointly filed
an action against the same defendant to recover for property damages to
plaintiff's automobile, resulting from the same accident involved in
the first action. After judgment for the plaintiff in the second action,
defendant's motion for summary judgment in the first action was granted.
52. 115 Ohio App. 288, 184 N.E.2d 830 (1961).
53. 180 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio C.P. 1961). A good discussion of recent Ohio insurance subrogation cases appears in Davis, Survey of Ohio Law - Civil Procedure, 13 W. REs. L. REV.
438,442 (1962).

